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Intersectional individuality: Georg Simmel’s concept of ‘the intersection of social circles’ 
and the emancipation of women 
 
Marcel Stoetzler, Bangor University 
 
Abstract: Georg Simmel’s ‘The intersection of social circles’, a chapter in his 1908 
Sociology, contains discussions of class, religion, ethnic and gender relations that are 
highly relevant to contemporary sociological concerns. Simmel’s argument is based 
on a notion of historical dynamic that interprets increasingly complex intersectionality 
as a sign of progressing civilization. The article establishes how Simmel describes 
‘the intersection of social circles’ and then looks at Simmel’s account through the 
concept of ‘intersectionality’ as developed in contemporary feminist theory. The 
article suggests that although some aspects of Simmel’s account of women in 
modernity are incompatible with contemporary feminism, the shared use of the same 
image, ‘intersection’, in Simmel and in contemporary feminist theory is the symptom 
of a shared concern with a particular aspect of the complexity of modern society. In 
Simmel, the increasing density of the intersections of social circles points to the 
increasingly complex individuality of modern subjects, whereas the use of the same 
image in contemporary feminist theory is part of a critique of inequality and 
oppression in the same modern society whose advent Simmel celebrated. 
Intersectionality is a characteristic of modern society that first became visible more 
than a century ago and has meanwhile become ever the more a signature of 
modernity. 
 
‘The intersection of social circles’ (‘Die Kreuzung sozialer Kreise’) is the title of the sixth 
chapter of Georg Simmel’s book Sociology of 1908 (Simmel 1992). This chapter incorporates 
a (much shorter) chapter from Simmel’s first sociological study, On Social Differentiation 
(Über sociale Differenzierung) from 1890 (Simmel 1989). I will in the body of this article 
examine the 1908 version of this text with a focus on how it discusses issues of race, class, 
gender and religion, suggesting that Simmel anticipated some aspects of contemporary 
discussions of these issues, while differing in others. Amongst contemporary social theory, I 
am here particularly interested in the comparison with discussions in feminist and anti-racist 
theory of ‘intersectionality’ as the shared use of the image of the ‘intersection’ points to 
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shared theoretical concerns with modern society that bridge the temporal divide between the 
late nineteenth and the late twentieth centuries respectively. The article makes in this manner 
a plea for the fruitfulness of dialogues between classical and contemporary social theory. 
Simmel adopted the concept of the ‘intersection of social circles’ from his teacher 
Moritz Lazarus who introduced the image in a text first published in 1862:
1
 
 
Within the large circle of society, smaller circles form, and ever narrower ones all the 
way down to the family. These circles do not stand one next to the other, but they 
intersect (durchschneiden) and touch in many ways. In this way a multiply intertwined 
relationship of connection and separation emerges within society. Accordingly the 
individual participates in the universal spirit (Gesammtgeiste) in multiply differing 
directions and intensities, allowing the emergence of an immense multiplicity of 
personal individualities (Lazarus 2003, pp. 50-1). 
 
Lazarus’ concern is here with the relationship of individual and society, and whatever groups 
and relationships – ‘circles’ – stand in between, a concern in which he was followed by 
Simmel. Lazarus chiefly asks how, and how intensively, the individual partakes in the 
‘universal spirit’ of the (national) society of which this individual is a member.2 Lazarus’ 
term ‘universal spirit’ (‘Gesammtgeist’) corresponds here roughly to what cultural 
anthropology and sociology later would refer to as ‘a culture’.3 Lazarus was a leading figure 
in the Jewish community of Berlin and became in the 1880s a key spokesman in the fight 
against the emergent movement of political antisemitism. One of his crucial contributions in 
this context was a lecture given in Berlin in 1879 (while Simmel was a student there) titled 
‘What does National mean?’ (Lazarus 2008) that is in many respects an articulation of 
multicultural liberalism avant la lettre (Stoetzler 2008 a and b, 2014): Lazarus is in this 
respect also a founding figure of anti-racist social science. 
                                                          
1
 Lazarus was also a German nationalist and early advocate of Prussian hegemony within 
Germany (Belke 1971). 
2
 The relationship of individual and collectivity in Lazarus and Simmel is discussed in 
Schmid (2005). Frisby (1992, p. 8) points to Lazarus’ authorship of the concept of the 
intersection of social circles. 
3
 The reference to the ‘universal spirit’, the ‘Gesammtgeist’ is central to the project of 
Völkerpsychologie that Lazarus inaugurated, the ‘science of folk spirits’ that was the 
precursor of cultural anthropology. The latter’s pioneer Franz Boas, was like Simmel strongly 
influenced by Lazarus (Kalmar 1987; Bunzl 2003).  
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Lazarus and Simmel discuss and welcome increased individuality and diversity 
through multiplied intersectionality as a characteristic of modernity. This general notion, if 
not the word, can surely be seen as one of several ideas that undergirded what was then 
emerging as the new discipline of sociology. Rather intriguingly, the exact same notion is 
also expressed in one of the foundational texts of American sociology, Charles H. Cooley’s 
Human Nature and the Social Order of 1902. As in Simmel, the context is the discussion of 
the specific character of social life in modernity: 
 
Again, the life of this age is more diversified than life ever was before, and this appears 
in the mind of the person who shares it as a greater variety of interests and affiliations. 
A man may be regarded as the point of intersection of an indefinite number of circles 
representing social groups, having as many arcs passing through him as there are 
groups. This diversity is connected with the growth of communication, and is another 
phase of the general enlargement and variegation of life. Because of the greater variety 
of imaginative contacts it is impossible for a normally open-minded individual not to 
lead a broader life, in some respects at least, than he would have led in the past (Cooley 
1922 [1902], pp. 147-8).
4
 
 
Neither Lazarus nor Cooley, though, made as systematic use of the image as Simmel did. The 
fact that not many readers of Simmel will be aware of this has a simple reason: Simmel’s 
concept of the ‘intersection of social circles’ was – more or less, and for a long time – lost in 
translation. The standard volume edited by Kurt H. Wolff in 1950, The Sociology of Georg 
Simmel, does not contain the chapter ‘Die Kreuzung sozialer Kreise’, a fact that is mentioned 
in the introduction where the missing chapter is referred to accurately as ‘The intersection of 
social circles’ (Simmel 1950, p. lxii). The chapter was subsequently published in English in 
1955 in the volume Conflict/ The Web of Group-Affiliations, also edited by Wolff. Crucially, 
though, the translator Reinhard Bendix rendered the title of the chapter in this edition as ‘The 
Web of Group-Affiliations’, and it is under this title that the text has become a sociological 
                                                          
4
 This is from chapter 4. I am not aware of any references to Simmel in Cooley, although he 
could have known Simmel’s work of 1890. Jacobs (2006, p. 66) remarks that the quoted 
passage is ‘reminiscent of Simmel’. Cooley mentioned Simmel in a journal (Jacobs 2006, p. 
12). Also Rieff (1993, p. xxiv) points to a similarity between Cooley and Simmel. One point 
of reference shared by Cooley and Simmel is their enthusiasm for Goethe (Coser 2003, pp. 
319 and 198). 
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key text, most notably perhaps in ‘network theory’ where ‘network’ represents what Bendix 
rendered as ‘web’.5 Bendix made his choice of wording explicit in a translator’s footnote, 
stating that ‘literal translation of this phrase, “intersection of social circles”, is almost 
meaningless’ (Simmel 1955, p. 125). Although Bendix felt that replacing the metaphor of the 
‘intersection’ with that of the ‘web’ constituted an improvement on Simmel’s own choice of 
words, it meant reducing the complexity of Simmel’s deliberately ambiguous, namely 
concrete as well as abstract, term ‘circles’ to the unequivocal concreteness of the term 
‘groups’.6 For these reasons, ‘the intersection of social circles’ went incognito in 1955; under 
the false flag of ‘webs’ and ‘networks’ it then engaged on a splendid career.7 Although 
Bendix’s translation of 1955 still contains occurrences of the word ‘intersect’ (e.g. on pages 
150 and 153), and in spite of its parallel occurrence in Cooley, the image of ‘the intersection’ 
played no important part in sociological theorizing until it was reinvented at the end of the 
1980s in the context of the feminist-antiracist discourse on ‘intersectionality’.  
‘Intersectionality’, which is now one of the most prominent concepts used in feminist-
inspired critical theorizing of social divisions and inequality including amongst others those 
of race, class, gender, age, sexuality and disability, denotes the fact that ‘intersecting’ social 
divisions (or categories, or ‘belongings‘) mutually construct each other’s specific and 
complex, often contradictory societal meanings and functions. The intersectionality approach 
aims to replace an additive, more mechanical manner of imagining the intersections of social 
circles – individual X is ‘a’ but at the same time also ‘b’ – by a more dynamic mode holding 
that individual X is ‘a’ in a ‘b’ kind of manner and ‘b’ in an ‘a’ kind of manner. Elizabeth 
Spelman, whose book Inessential Woman of 1988 was a crucial contribution to the formation 
of the feminist intersectionality discourse, argues that paying attention to the mutual 
                                                          
5
 On Simmel in ‘network theory’, see Levine et al. 1976; Breiger 1974; Pescosolido and 
Rubin 2000; Diani 2000; Nollert 2010; Erikson 2011. Rock (1979) discusses Simmel’s 
influence on the ‘Chicago school’. Schober (2009) examines parallels between Simmel’s 
concept of ‘intersections’ and some aspects of mostly post-Gramscian, British Cultural 
Studies discourses. Petzke (2011) discusses Simmel’s chapter on ‘the intersection of social 
circles’ in relation to Dilthey, another philosopher strongly influenced by Moritz Lazarus, and 
Max Weber. 
6
 In the new translation of 2009, the chapter is included and titled accurately ‘The intersection 
of social circles’ (Simmel 2009). In Bendix’s defence it must be said that Simmel used the 
words ‘circle’ and ‘group’ often in a way that made them seem interchangeable. Nevertheless 
it is crucial to keep in mind that ‘Kreise’ (circles) means in Simmel’s use abstract ‘category’ 
as well as concrete ‘group’. 
7
 Coser points to the liberal connotations of Simmel’s concept of the ‘intersections of social 
circles’ (Coser 2003, pp. 190-1). 
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constitution of the intersecting categories in the moment of their intersection is important not 
only for identifying and empowering ‘the most oppressed’ but just as importantly for 
understanding any subject position in society: 
 
The oppression white middle-class women are subject to is not the oppression women 
face ‘as women’ but the oppression white middle-class women face. Their race and 
class are not irrelevant to the oppression they face even though they are not oppressed 
on account of their race and class (Spelman 1988, p. 77). 
 
Spelman argues that ‘additive analyses of identity and oppression can work against an 
understanding of the relations between gender and other elements of identity, between sexism 
and other forms of oppression’ (Spelman 1988, p. 115); for example, to say simply that Black 
women experience ‘sexism and racism’ suggests ‘that Black women experience one form of 
oppression, as Blacks (the same thing Black men experience) and that they experience 
another form of oppression, as women (the same thing white women experience)’ (Spelman 
1988, p. 122). This is not the case, though:  
 
How one form of oppression is experienced is influenced by and influences how 
another form is experienced. An additive analysis treats the oppression of a Black 
woman in a society that is racist as well as sexist as if it were a further burden when, in 
fact, it is a different burden ... sexism and racism must be seen as interlocking, and not 
as piled upon each other (Spelman 1988, p. 123). 
 
Central to the feminist discourse on intersectionality is a critique of the more traditional 
notion of the ‘triple oppression’ of e.g. Black working class women, considering the latter 
‘unsatisfactory because it treats forms of subordination and oppression through race, sex, and 
class as cumulative’ when the point is rather to understand them ‘as articulating or 
intersecting together to produce specific effects’ which ‘cannot be mechanistically 
understood. It is the intersection of subordinations that is important and they cannot be 
treated as different layers of oppression’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993, p. 100). The 
feminist discourse on intersectionality will be discussed further down.
8
 
                                                          
8
 The only reference to Simmel in the ‘intersectionality’ discourse I know of is in a text by 
Walby in which she proposes adding ‘complexity theory’ to ‘dual systems theory’. Walby 
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 Before turning to a discussion of Simmel’s conception of intersectional individuality 
through the lenses of the contemporary intersectionality discourse in the latter part of the 
article, I will in the first step now retrace how Simmel develops his concept of the 
‘intersection of social circles’ and then in a second step focus on how he deploys it in the 
context of women’s emancipation. In his characteristic manner, Simmel proceeds by going 
through an extended series of examples, layering different aspects of the concept onto each 
other, a method of presentation that is similar to what Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. 
Adorno (under Simmel’s influence) later would refer to as a ‘constellation’ or ‘configuration’ 
of concepts (Benzer 2011, p. 162). No less typical of Simmel’s discourse is that he includes 
gender, nationality and race issues in his conceptual argument.  
 
INTERSECTIONAL PERSONALITY IN ‘THE INTERSECTION OF SOCIAL CIRCLES’ 
 
Simmel introduces the problem early in the chapter with a short paragraph on the observation 
that Australian aborigines are members of totemic associations as well as of tribes, which 
constitutes the most elementary, or ‘primitive’ form of an intersection of social circles. 
Simmel suggests that the complexity achieved by this primitive form of intersectionality 
enriches the aborigines’ social life. From here Simmel jumps straight to ‘modern family life’ 
(Simmel 1992, p. 461; 1955, p. 133; 2009, p. 367), arguing that ‘the solidarity among 
members of the same sex’ produces a similar form of complexity within modern families:  
 
For example, a mother’s instincts will cause her to side with her son as her own kin on 
occasions when she is drawn into the disputes between him and his wife. But on 
another occasion her instincts may cause her to take the side of her daughter-in-law as a 
member of her own sex (als Geschlechtsgenossin) (461; 133; 367).
9
 
 
Simmel adds that this applies ‘only insofar as her instincts are acted out a priori, and without 
regard to all the individual nuances of the case.’ Simmel states: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
references ‘The Web of Group-Affiliations’ stating that social systems are ‘porous and 
weblike’ (Walby 2007, p. 460). 
9
 In the following references the first numbers are to the German text (Simmel 1992), the 
second number to the translation by Bendix (Simmel 1955), and the third number to the new 
translation (Simmel 2009). All translations from Simmel’s ‘The intersection of social circles’ 
are based on Simmel 1955, amended with the help of Simmel 1992 and Simmel 2009. 
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To belong to the same sex (Geschlechtsgleichheit) is one of the causes of collective 
action (Einigungsursachen), which pervade social life perennially, and which 
intermingles with all other causes of collective action in the most varied ways and 
degrees (461; 133; 367). 
 
In the next step of his argument Simmel states that belonging to an age group 
(Altersgleichheit) is similar to belonging to a sex group (Geschlechtsgleichheit) as a ‘basis of 
division’ (Einteilungsgrund). Significantly, though, Simmel frames his argument within a 
historical perspective and a concern with the concepts of modernity and individuality that 
underlies his sociology as a whole: he suggests that ‘age-groups provide such a basis of 
solidarity only when the culture is still without an extensive intellectual life’ (462; 134; 368) 
because the latter fosters ‘the unfolding of individual intellectual differences’ resulting in 
ideologies and parties. ‘Extensive intellectual life’ produces more circles, more intersections 
and thus reduces the relevance of the more ‘organic’ (this seems to mean, primitive) modes of 
belonging such as age and sex. Simmel contrasts the family as one of the simplest with the 
‘republic of scholars’ (Gelehrtenrepublik) as one of the most complex and diverse ‘social 
circles’ (462; 135; 368). Simmel argues that historically, circles of more recent origin tend to 
be more rational and give the ‘appearance of being determined by a purpose, since their 
affairs revolve around intellectually articulated interests’ (463; 137; 370). Apart from the 
increasingly intellectual and rational character of newly emerging, more modern circles, 
Simmel argues their multiplication is itself a hallmark of historical evolution, and, by 
implication, of civilizational progress: ‘The number of different social circles in which the 
individual is positioned is one of the benchmarks of civilization (Gradmesser der Kultur)’ 
(464; 138; 370). Simmel refers to the Middle Ages as a foil against which to contrast the 
modernity of multiply intersecting circles: some typically medieval circles such as guilds 
explicitly banned their members from belonging to a series of other circles: belonging to a 
particular guild meant by definition that one did not belong to the circles, or categories, 
‘woman’ or ‘Jew’, for example. More modern circles are less exclusive and make thereby the 
positioning of individuals increasingly complex.  
The concept of intersecting circles is crucial to Simmel’s concept of personality:  
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The groups to which the individual belongs constitute a system of coordinates, as it 
were, such that each additional group to which he belongs determines him more exactly 
and more unambiguously … the larger the number of circles to which an individual 
belongs, the more improbable is it that other persons will exhibit the same combination 
of group-affiliations, that these particular circles will intersect once again [in another 
individual] (466; 140; 371-2). 
 
Simmel adds an interesting aspect of his concept of ‘circles’ when he states that ‘to speak 
platonically, each thing has a part in as many ideas as it has manifold attributes, and it 
achieves thereby its individual determinateness (Bestimmtheit)’ (467; 140; 372). This 
statement in particular illustrates the deliberate ambiguity of Simmel’s concept between 
‘group’ (such as a guild) and ‘category’ (such as sex) which he likens to platonic ‘ideas’ or 
essences. The continuous play on this ambiguity and openness is important to Simmel’s 
argument. 
Simmel emphasises repeatedly that he aims to describe a historical process, and he 
characterises this process as bringing benefits as well as problems: 
 
As the individual leaves his established position within one primary group, he comes to 
stand at a point at which many groups intersect. The individual as a moral personality 
comes to be circumscribed in an entirely new way, but he also faces new problems. The 
security and lack of ambiguity in his former position in the first instance gives way to 
ambivalence in the directions his life takes (Schwankung der Lebenstendenzen). This is 
the sense of an old English proverb that says: he who speaks two languages is a knave 
(467-8; 141; 372-3). 
 
The multiplication of intersecting circles creates problems, but these same problems also 
have positive effects (again a typical pattern of Simmel’s take on modernity): as a kind of 
counter-tendency, they strengthen what we would now call personal identity (die Einheit der 
Persönlichkeit, literally: the unity or integration of the personality): ‘The ego can become 
more clearly conscious of this unity, the more he is confronted with the task of reconciling 
within himself a diversity of group-interests’ (468; 142; 373). 
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In Simmel’s imagery, belonging to several different circles has differing effects 
depending on whether these circles are parallel or concentric (472; 147; 376), a formulation 
that anticipates the concept of ‘nestedness’ in complexity theory and the distinction between 
embedded and dis-embedded ties in network theory.
10
 The modern situation is characterized 
by an increasing number of non-concentric circles, and therewith intersections, as only non-
concentric circles intersect: ‘Standing in the intersection of two circles will define the person 
the more determinately, the less participation in one circle by itself indicates participation in 
the other’ (p. 474; 150; 378). 
Next, Simmel describes cases in which an individual is differently positioned in terms 
of power or rank in relation to different circles (478; 154; 381). For example in countries with 
universal draft an ‘intellectually and socially high placed man must obey a non-
commissioned officer’ (478; 154; 381). Likewise, ‘the tutor of a prince is to be superior to his 
charge, he is to dominate and direct him – and yet he is, on the other hand, a servant, while 
his charge is the master.’11 Other examples Simmel uses are that of business people who are 
‘in solidarity with each other’ in a multiplicity of regards, but competitors in others – again, a 
significant characteristic of modernity – and that of the member of a political party who 
cultivates literary, aesthetic or religious tendencies that are typically pursued by members of 
the opposite party: the individual might deliberately seek such, as it were, inconsistent, 
affiliations with the intention not to ‘surrender’ completely to the ‘spell of the party ’ (480; 
155-6; 382-3).  
 
MODERN RELIGION INTERSECTS MANY SOCIAL CIRCLES 
 
Simmel dedicates a long section to the question of religion. He states that ‘religious 
affiliation is the most important and at the same time the most characteristic example [of the 
process of individualization] ever since religion has been emancipated from racial, national, 
or local ties (Lösung der Religion von der stammesmäßigen, nationalen oder lokalen 
                                                          
10
 These more contemporary approaches in social theory have replaced more strictly 
formalized theoretical language for classical social theory’s grounding in the philosophy of 
history. Aiming to rid social theory of the lacunae of nineteenth-century historism, post-
classical theory arguably overshot its target by ridding theory of its grounding in history tout 
court. I see my present attempt as part of a tendency to restore to theory its sense of history. 
11
 The teaching situation in the contemporary university is similar: lecturers teach students 
who are customers in a context where the customer is not just prince but king. 
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Bindung), a world-historical fact of immeasurable significance’ (480; 157; 383).12 The 
‘essence’ of religion expresses itself equally completely whether the religious community is 
congruent with the (civic) community in other ‘essential or comprehensive interests’ or 
whether it is completely disconnected from such other interests. Simmel states – perhaps, 
given the historical context of the emerging movement of political antisemitism (Stoetzler 
2010), somewhat surprisingly – that ‘it is perfectly understandable that the co-existence and 
the sharing of human interests is not possible with people who do not share one’s faith’ (480-
1; 157; 383). The ‘perfectly understandable’ need for religious unity was initially satisfied by 
the fact that religious and societal community coincided, but since this tends not to be the 
case anymore (chiefly, since the emergence of Christianity), the power of religion shows 
itself where it unites coreligionists across various differences in other respects (481; 157; 
383). The circle ‘religion’ intersects in modernity with more or less all other social circles. 
Simmel discusses in this context several cases: he writes that the 1707 union of 
England and Scotland was premised on the separation of religious and political constitutions 
that allowed separate churches to continue to exist that otherwise would have prevented 
political union (483; 160; 385). The circles ‘nation’ and ‘religion’ had been more or less 
concentric in the preceding period but now, beginning with the eighteenth century, became 
less and less concentric (and therewith more intersecting). Simmel reports that in 1896 Jewish 
workers in Manchester formed an organisation that included Jewish workers of all trades with 
the intention to cooperate through this organization with (non-Jewish, general) trade unions. 
They failed to do so, though, because the trade unions insisted on the formation of trade-
specific organizations only; the Jewish workers were not numerous enough, however, to form 
a series of Jewish trade-specific organizations. By contrast, Catholic workers in Germany, 
being much more numerous, were able to develop Catholic trade unions organized according 
to trades (484; 161; 386): a trade union of Catholic carpenters, for example, itself the 
intersection of the circles ‘Catholics’ and ‘carpenters’, would internally have been concentric 
and non-intersecting. These are amongst the cases Simmel uses to illustrate his point that the 
                                                          
12
 The word ‘Stamm’ is difficult to translate. Literally denoting the trunk of a tree it can in 
late nineteenth-century contexts denote a category either below or above the level of the 
nation, i.e. ‘tribe’ or ‘race’. In liberal-nationalist discourse, the ‘stammesmäßigen’ divisions 
within the still not fully established nation were then often understood as representing 
portions of those larger, world-historical units, the ‘races’. Here the sequence 
‘stammesmäßigen, nationalen oder lokalen Bindung’, with the nation in the middle, suggests 
the meaning ‘racial’. 
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circle ‘religion’ intersects in various ways with a multiplicity of modern political and social 
‘circles’.  
 
SIMMEL’S INTERSECTIONAL ACCOUNT OF WORKERS AND WOMEN 
 
Once religion became non-identical to societal community in general, it came to constitute a 
‘new’ social circle. Simmel discusses the specifically modern circle ‘worker’ in a similar 
manner. He uses the opportunity of this particular example to emphasise the role the 
formation of concepts plays in the process of creating new social circles (493; 172; 393). 
‘The identical relation to capital (das gleichmäßige Verhältnis zum Kapital)’ unites all wage 
labourers irrespective of whether they make ‘cannons or toys’. This ‘identical relation’ did 
not emerge spontaneously, though, but needed to be discovered, understood and articulated, 
and then acted upon, in order to become actual: 
 
The solidarity of wage labor exemplifies a group-formation based on a pervasive social 
awareness. … After the various trades have developed out of the growing division of 
labor, more abstract considerations now cut across the differences between the trades 
and establish a new social circle (493; 172-3; 393-4). 
 
Simmel describes this as a process of abstraction: the concept of the wage labourer provides a 
focus, or ‘logical-formal cohesion (logisch-formale Zusammenfassung)’ to a set of ‘social 
forces, relations and conditions’ (494; 173-4; 394) to which it then reacts. ‘Here, logical and 
socio-historical processes act and react on one another’ (494; 173; 394). Only ‘traversing all 
differences of trade’ made possible the general strike. Simmel emphasises that ‘English 
reactionaries’ understood this connection already at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
when the Corresponding Societies Act banned ‘written communication amongst workers’ 
associations’ as well as any associations composed by workers of different trades. The 
‘English reactionaries’ feared quite rightly that such communication could create ‘a new 
social circle’ and a communality that would neutralise the differences.  
Following the description of the constitution of concept and reality of ‘wage labourer’ 
through a process of abstraction that allows the ‘traversing of differences’, Simmel discusses 
as ‘another example for … a quasi-abstract group’ that of women (499; 179; 398). He argues 
that before the contemporary period, every single woman had been ‘confined to a single 
12 
 
group’, the household, not benefiting from any intersections. Due to recent societal 
developments, women now ‘constitute a new social group’. ‘Up to now’, by contrast and 
paradoxically, woman had been prevented from ‘group-formation (Genossenschaftsbildung) 
in its strict sense, namely the practical solidarity with the other women’ by the most general 
characteristic of what it meant to be a woman, which had  
 
banned her into the limits of the home, confined [her] to devote herself to particular 
individuals, and prevented [her] from transcending the group-relations established by 
marriage, family, social life, and perhaps charity and religion (499; 180; 398). 
 
‘That isolation of women from one another, caused by the integration (Hineinbauung) of each 
into an entirely individual sphere of interests, was based upon woman’s being totally different 
(völligen Differenz) from man’ (500; 181; 399): the woman did only what the man did not 
want or was not able to do. Women were, in other words, prevented from forming a circle of 
their own (in the double sense of category and group) by being totally different from men: by 
implication, forming social circles and enjoying the liberating, individualizing effects of their 
intersections used to be, until very recently, a male privilege.
13
 Simmel’s argument assumes 
here the form of a paradoxical dialectic (Wechselwirkung, reciprocity) that is characteristic of 
the most inspired moments of his theorizing: 
 
In recent years, women have placed themselves in direct opposition to men in aiming at 
equalization (Ausgleichung) in all these respects, … and in occasional beginnings they 
have succeeded; a partisan assertion of difference (parteimäßige Differenz) from the 
men, emphasising solidarity of interests amongst women, is emerging – be it as its 
cause or its effect – just in the same moment that the basic difference from men in 
terms of being and acting, in legal terms and in terms of interests is diminishing (500; 
181; 399). 
 
Simmel captures here in his theorization of the constitution of ‘new’ social circles in 
modernity a peculiar dialectic between identity and difference: the growing self-assertion of 
                                                          
13
 As an aside, Simmel notes that ‘in primitive ethnological conditions’ women’s 
‘dissociation’ is less strong: the modern condition that allows the social circle of ‘woman’ to 
emerge in a more concrete sense seems almost like a return to a ‘primitive’ condition. 
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the new social category ‘woman’ owes itself to women’s becoming less totally different from 
men, to the extent that they are able now to constitute a ‘social circle’. At a (pre-modern) 
point when women actually were totally different – basically not much more than domestic 
slaves – they were not able to assert their specific difference and form a circle (category or 
group). The constitution of an actual category or ‘social circle’ of women means the 
‘formation of a higher circle that is defined by a general concept (Bildung eines höheren, 
durch einen Allgemeinbegriff zusammengeschlossenen Kreises)’ (501; 182; 399). Simmel 
concludes the argument with an observation on the contemporary women’s movement. He 
writes that 
 
today no one can predict either direction or limitation of the movement for the 
emancipation of women. However, this much can be said, that already many women as 
individuals are aware of their position at the intersection of many circles. On the one 
hand, they feel closely tied to the individuals and the activities, which fill their personal 
life. But they are conscious, on the other hand, of their solidarity with all women (502; 
183; 401). 
 
These remarks on the emerging women’s movement illustrate well Simmel’s conception of 
‘interaction’ (Wechselwirkung): the emergence of an actual concept and circle of women 
coincides and mutually interacts with the diminishing of their absolute difference to men, 
whereby he does not take a position on whether there is causality running one way or the 
other. When previously women had been very different, there was no concept of female 
difference and no interaction between actual women; they had simply existed as fixed entities 
within fixed circles (the family, the household) without experiencing any intersectionality. 
This has changed in the context of modernity: woman is a circle now that has multiple 
intersections. This example points to a key aspect of Simmel’s sociology, an underlying, very 
nineteenth-century, optimistic liberal belief in generally evolving progress and modernization 
that manifests itself in increasingly complex individuality and the multiplication of 
intersecting circles. 
 
SIMMEL AND THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
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Simmel’s account of the increased intersectionality of women in modernity in the sixth 
chapter of Sociology can be contextualised by several less canonical texts on the women’s 
movement that elucidate the nearly-feminist aspects of his perspective. In spite of an isolated 
attempt at promoting his writings on gender issues by Lewis Coser (1977) and an edition of 
some of his writings On Women, Sexuality, and Love by Guy Oakes (Simmel 1984), Simmel 
failed to have much lasting impact on modern feminism, and for good reasons.
14
 Already in 
his own time only representatives of the bourgeois women’s movement took note of and 
embraced Simmel’s writings on women, while its more radical representatives rejected 
Simmel’s notion that women were ‘the less differentiated, less gendered [geschlechtslosere] 
being’ that lacked a ‘principle of development’ (Dahme and Köhnke 1985, p. 13; Witz 2001). 
Simmel held, in this vein, that men are more different from each other than women are, 
because men are more prone to ‘standing in the intersections of social circles’: women lack 
intersectionality and therewith individuality and modernity.
15
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 The volume by Oakes does not contain Simmel’s earlier writings on the subject in which 
Simmel’s more conservative tendencies are less obvious (Dahme 1988, p. 425). Van Vucht 
Tijssen (1991) writes that Marianne Weber held against Simmel that also women want to 
engage with and within ‘objective culture’ and welcomed the fact that modernization opens 
up this possibility. Lichtblau discusses Simmel’s use of a metaphysical notion of gender 
polarity for a critique of modern, masculine ‘objective’ culture (Lichtblau 1996, pp. 292-
315). Comparing Simmel to Tönnies, he writes that Tönnies sees no room for a female 
contribution to modern ‘objective culture’ and therefore exiles femininity into a utopian space 
that will emerge after the final (re-)mutation of Gesellschaft into Gemeinschaft will have 
abolished the distinction between objective and subjective culture as such, whereas Simmel 
who is more accepting of the reality of modern bourgeois society looks for a way how 
women can contribute to and improve objective culture in the present where their traditional 
realm – the house economy – is in the process of disappearing (ibid., 300-301). Leck presents 
Simmel rather enthusiastically as a key figure in German modernism and argues that he 
employed what looks like a conservative strategy, the maintenance of ‘naturalized 
conceptions of gender’, in pursuit of progressive social change that had egalitarian and 
emancipatory traits. He suggests that Simmel went far beyond what bourgeois feminists 
aimed for, namely a ‘complete revolution in culture’, anticipating 1970s/1980s ‘cultural 
feminism’ (Leck 2000, p. 142). Vromen (1987), Moser-Stark (2003) and Parkins (2009) 
discuss Simmel’s tendency to construct femininity as ‘the other’ of modernity. The sixth 
chapter of Sociology is not referenced by any of these commentators. 
15
 Dahme and Köhnke (1985, p. 15-16) point out that Simmel also distinguished (in some of 
his later writings) ‘qualitative individualism’ from ‘modern’ or ‘quantitative or sociological 
individualism’. The latter is the individualism that emerges in ‘the intersections of social 
circles’ as described in the sixth chapter of Sociology, while the former is not socially 
determined. Those who are characterised by ‘qualitative individuality’ have ‘the power to 
give themselves their own norms, to live only by their own ideals and their own laws.’ 
Paradigmatic personalities of this type are Rembrandt and Goethe. This dimension of 
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Simmel’s position on both, the women’s movement and the labour movement, can be 
gauged from an article he wrote on a Berlin women’s conference in 1896, titled ‘The 
Women’s Conference and Social Democracy’ (Simmel 1985 [1896], pp. 133-8). Simmel 
argues here that the positions of the bourgeois and the proletarian women’s movements are 
‘first of all antagonistic to each other’ (Simmel 1985, p. 136), but – in the sense of his 
concept of reciprocity – ‘two sides of the same total social phenomenon (sozialen 
Gesamterscheinung)’ (Simmel 1985, p. 138): the same industrial development has destroyed 
‘the natural division of labour between the sexes’ for both classes, but in different ways: 
proletarian girls and women who have been ‘thrown’ into industrial production are being 
deprived of the protection through the family and prevented from fulfilling their domestic 
duties, which is why their ‘social freedom’ (namely the freedom to engage in wage labour) 
must be limited for their own good; bourgeois women, by contrast, are being deprived of 
sufficiently fulfilling functions in the household, so that they long to expand their ‘social 
freedom’ in the search for new fields of fulfilling activity: 
 
The household, from which the proletarian woman is violently evicted, violently holds 
back the bourgeois woman; the independent economic activity that has become a curse 
for the former, would be a blessing for the latter (Simmel 1985, p. 137). 
 
Simmel asserts that ‘being a woman’ can have entirely different meaning depending on 
differing class positions. Both groups’ suffering is caused by the same problem: ‘the 
development of objective social relations’, the ‘culture and technology of things (Kultur und 
Technik der Sachen)’, has ‘progressed faster than the development and adaptation of the 
individuals’ (Simmel 1985, p. 137). Both movements, although pursuing apparently opposite 
goals, ought therefore to cooperate to correct this mismatch, that Simmel by implication 
imagines to be only a temporary kind of, as it were, uneven development. 
This argument is framed by Simmel’s disapproval of the proletarian women’s 
movement’s refusal to cooperate with what they refer to as the ‘ladies’ movement’ (while he 
also criticizes the bourgeois women’s movement for failing to address the question of a future 
constitution of society at large [Simmel 1985, 136]). Simmel suggests that Social 
Democracy’s mistaken strategic position is rooted in its Hegelian legacy: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Simmel’s later thinking, evocative of Nietzsche and Lebensphilosophie, is hard to reconcile 
with his proto-constructivist, sociological liberalism. 
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Socialism’s unitary formula can be replaced by the practical work on the details of 
social relations just as the shibboleth of Hegelian philosophy has been replaced by the 
patient work of cognizing the details of the world whose gradual addition 
(allmählichem Zusammenfügen) one day may resolve the riddle of the whole; 
induction, as it were, can replace deduction, so that the whole will emerge from the sum 
of the particulars (Simmel 1985, p. 135). 
 
Simmel suggests that the ‘sober’ and ‘evolutionary’ perspective that he recommends has 
already taken hold of the ‘wider socialist circles’ and adds:  
 
This may well be, like so often, a case of just the women following through the chosen 
direction to its most radical ramifications, which might have to do with the less 
differentiated, more uniform and more impulsive character of female emotional life 
(größeren Undifferenziertheit, Einheitlichkeit und Impulsivität des weiblichen 
Gefühlslebens) (Simmel 1985, p. 135).  
 
Traditionally having been deprived of the benefits of multiple intersections, differentiation 
and complexity of positioning, women are still catching up with men, which is why 
proletarian women still hold on to outdated and ‘speculative’ Hegelian ‘formulas’ – in 
particular the notion the ‘socialisation of the means of production’ will solve all social 
problems (Simmel 1985, p. 135) – which the wider socialist movement has already replaced 
with a commitment to piecemeal research and reform. Simmel argues that one’s being a 
woman shapes how one’s being a proletarian translates into either practical or not so practical 
politics. ‘Being a woman’, though, implies here ‘slightly lagging behind societal evolution’. 
Simmel’s thinking stands very much in the intersection of a progressive, pro-feminist and a 
more conservative (in fact, right-wing liberal) line of evolutionary thinking, an ambiguity that 
makes reading Simmel’s text all the more interesting. In the remainder of the article I will 
explore whether the progressive side of Simmel can be read against the more conservative 
side, and whether his account of the ‘intersection of social circles’ can add anything to 
contemporary debates on the complexity of social divisions.  
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SIMMEL AND THE CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST CONCEPT OF 
INTERSECTIONALITY 
 
In writing about Simmel’s ‘intersectional concept of individuality’, I invoke a similarity 
between a key concept in Simmel’s sociology and one of the key concepts in contemporary 
feminist theory and critical race studies, ‘intersectionality’. Although ‘intersection’ is a 
central concept in the sixth chapter of Simmel’s Sociology, the words ‘intersectional’ and 
‘intersectionality’ do not occur there; these exact words are usually attributed to the Afro-
American legal scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991). Others often credited with having 
co-originated the discourse on intersectionality include Patricia Hill Collins (1991, 1998), 
Elizabeth Spelman (1988), and, in Britain, Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1983, 
1993).
16
 The intersectionality discourse emerged from feminist social movement contexts of 
the 1980s and 1990s, most prominently Black feminism in the USA. Not unlike the related 
discourses on ‘standpoint theory’ and ‘situated knowledges’, theoretical influences typically 
included Marxist feminism, critical theory and Mannheimian sociology of knowledge. 
Intersectionality starts out from accounts of the invisibility of the societal experiences of 
members of some specific groups of society, Black women most prominently, or inversely, 
the misrepresentation of some specific group’s experience as that of a much more 
comprehensive category of people (such as Black men being seen as representing ‘Blacks’). It 
is chiefly about keeping categories such as sex, race, class and sexuality fluid and dynamic 
enough to acknowledge that any one category (e.g. ‘Blackness’) does not have one fixed 
meaning for anyone who ‘falls under’ that category irrespective of what other categories he 
or she ‘falls under’, too, such as gender, class, age or sexuality. ‘Being a woman’ can mean 
entirely different things depending on whether one is of this or that ethnicity, race, sexuality, 
ability or age group. This important fact has been addressed as the ‘mutual constitution’ of 
categories of social division, as opposed to merely ‘additive’ accounts of multiple 
discrimination that imply – to use once more the example from Afro-American feminist 
literature – that one is a woman in addition to being Black, as if ‘being a woman’ and ‘being 
Black’ were mutually independent and stand-alone categories, identities or, with Simmel, 
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 More recent accounts are provided in Berger and Guidroz 2009; Bilge 2010; Brah and 
Phoenix 2004; Cho, Crenshaw, McCall 2013; Choo and Ferree 2010; Davis 2008; Knapp 
2005; McCall 2005; Nash 2008 and 2011; Patil 2013; Yuval-Davis 2006, 2011 and 2012. 
18 
 
‘circles’. The salient point is, instead, to take in account how the social meaning of each 
category shapes or determines that of all the others.  
 The fact that ‘intersectionality’ became the predominant signifier (the ‘buzzword’) of 
a very large area of feminist theorizing that has developed since the 1970s, if not earlier, has 
been explained by Kathy Davis in terms of the fact ‘that successful theories thrive on 
ambiguity and incompleteness’ and ‘provide a novel twist to an old problem’ (Davis 2008, p. 
70). There is surely some truth in this, but I would like to suggest that more specifically, the 
success of ‘intersectionality’ also benefited from its resonances with classical social theory: 
academically trained audiences might easily warm to the concept because ‘intersectionality’ 
transports and restates important and radical insights won in the context of anti-systemic 
movements (1970s and 1980s socialist and Black feminisms)
17
 in a terminology that is rooted 
in the wider social science tradition. Arguably, the reception of Simmel is so deeply 
entrenched in the American social science context that a concept that originates in Simmel 
might not anymore be recognizable as such (Levine, Carter, Gorman, 1976 a and b) and 
therewith becomes available for creative re-coding. 
One of the ambiguities in the literature on intersectionality concerns which image 
exactly underlies the metaphor: sometimes the image of a road intersection is invoked, such 
as in Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 1989 article that is commonly seen as the break-out moment of 
the discourse, whereas most often the image that ‘intersectionality’ points to is that of 
intersecting circles or other geometrical shapes. The ‘road intersection’ image occurs in the 
following passage: 
 
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four 
directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one 
direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be 
caused by cars travelling from any number of directions and sometimes, from all of 
them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her 
injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination (Crenshaw 1989, p. 
149). 
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 A key text was Angela Davis’ Women, Race and Class (1981) that inspired many of those 
Black feminists who contributed to the emerging intersectionality discourse. 
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Some commentators have pointed out that the image of the road intersection does actually not 
serve Crenshaw’s argument very well as roads are not mutually constituted by their 
intersections (Walgenbach 2010, p. 248). Similarly, Yuval-Davis has called the image 
‘additive’ and criticises it as simplistic (Yuval-Davis 2006, p. 196). At an actual crossroads 
one is run over by a car from either this or that direction, but no car ever comes from several 
directions at the same time. The most important aspect of the intersectionality paradigm is not 
transported by the road intersection image. 
It is significant to note that Crenshaw often uses ‘interaction’ as a near-synonym of 
‘intersection’. She states, for example, that she ‘used the concept of intersectionality to 
denote the various ways in which race and gender interact… I have used intersectionality as a 
way to articulate the interaction of racism and patriarchy generally’ (Crenshaw 1991, pp. 
1244 and 1265). If ‘intersection’ is meant to illustrate the notion of ‘interaction’, then the 
image of the road intersection is unhelpful: the image of intersecting circles much better 
illustrates ‘interaction’ – which in turn recalls Simmel’s term ‘Wechselwirkung’ – as circles 
can be figured as force fields in whose intersections something happens that does not happen 
in neighbouring spaces. Venn-diagram-style intersection also points to more durable 
conditions than the image of a car crash does. In fact, many contributors to the 
intersectionality discourse seem to think of intersecting circles rather than of roads, as can be 
seen from visual materials such as book covers and conference posters. As early as 1981 
images of intersecting circles were used ‘to illustrate how ethnicity, class and gender 
contributed alone, and in interaction, as material and normative bases of domination, none of 
which necessarily had priority’ (Denis 2008, p. 680).18 Reading intersectionality in terms of 
intersecting circles best reflects the actual content of the feminist and anti-racist discourse on 
intersectionality.  
Whether the shared use of the image of ‘the intersections of social circles’ in Simmel 
and the contemporary intersectionality discourse can be attributed to a continuous if 
unacknowledged presence of Simmel’s conception within the social science tradition is of 
course a speculative argument. Another argument to the same effect is perhaps more relevant: 
intersectionality theory is most likely to be formulated by outsiders with an insight, a notion 
whose original formulation by the sociology of knowledge, perhaps not incidentally, can be 
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 Carastathis (2008) uses drawings of intersecting circles to illustrate ‘the intersectional 
model of identity’. The cover of Berger and Guidroz (2009) shows intersecting circles and 
squares. 
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traced back to another highly influential chapter of Simmel’s Sociology, the excursus on ‘The 
stranger’. Simmel and Lazarus, from whom Simmel borrowed the image of the intersecting 
circles, pioneered modern social science out of the ‘double consciousness’ (to use Du Bois’ 
term, another Berlin University alumnus) of German-speaking Jews in what was then the 
Austrian-Hungarian Empire, and out of the cognitive dissonances this situation produced. 
Beyond the general relevance of an overarching social theory tradition influenced by Simmel, 
one can hear a distant echo from those classic ‘outsiders’ in the discourse on 
‘intersectionality’ as conceived by Afro-American feminists a century later, similarly 
outsiders in another very large, multi-ethnic state equally preoccupied with issues of 
integration and assimilation. Other feminists who contributed to this discourse, such as 
Yuval-Davis and Anthias, surely learned a thing or two about strangers and intersections in 
Israel and Cyprus, respectively. Patricia Hill Collins, the preeminent figure of Black feminist 
thought, has repeatedly embraced the sociological motives of ‘the outsider’ and ‘the stranger’ 
(Collins 1986, 2005). Lazarus, Simmel, Crenshaw and others described the same modern 
society which made them use the same image in order to express similar, albeit not identical 
ideas about this reality, being socially located in places where intersectionality is evident and 
problematic enough to provoke intersectional theories.  
 When looking at Simmel’s account of the ‘intersection of social circles’ from the 
perspective of the contemporary discourse on intersectionality, one finds that Simmel’s 
conception does allow him to account for the mutual constitution of several different aspects 
of an individual’s positioning at the intersection of several social circles. Simmel describes on 
several occasions how the intersection changes the meaning of all intersecting circles (i.e. 
categories) but does not put much emphasis on this: his guiding interest in his chapter on 
‘intersecting circles’ is with something else, namely a theory of increasingly complex 
individuality as the signature of modernity. Simmel formulates intersectionality theory in 
passing, as it were. 
An example of ‘strong intersectionality’ in Simmel’s text is the passage on military 
service under conditions of universal draft when a ‘high placed man’ must obey someone of 
lower status (Simmel as above, 478; 154; 381). In this particular constellation, social 
positioning in terms of class and level of formal education has a different meaning from that 
it will have elsewhere. The meaning of belonging to that particular ‘social circle’ is 
constructed in the intersection with other circles, such as the circle ‘military’. High social 
status in society at large might translate as less powerful positioning in the army, or might on 
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occasion even be a disadvantage (when, say, an officer from a lower class background takes 
some form of class revenge on ‘a toff’). Another example mentioned before is that of ‘the 
tutor of a prince’: the meaning of the social role of the ‘tutor’ is constructed by who the 
student is. Far from fixed, it is contingent on its intersectional positioning. Most striking is 
perhaps Simmel’s discussion of how household and ‘independent economic activity’ have 
opposite social meanings for bourgeois and proletarian women respectively (Simmel 1985, p. 
137): the freedom to engage in wage labour liberates bourgeois women from domestic 
confinement, while it evicts proletarian women from a (supposedly) protective family home. 
The extent to which the structure of Simmel’s argument allows for complexity is here more 
admirable than is the dubious proposition wage labour prevented proletarian women from 
fulfilling their domestic duties: many women surely welcomed being rid of those ‘duties’, 
albeit others – not without reason – doubted the benefits of ‘being emancipated’ into the 
capitalist labour market.  
Two further formulations from Simmel’s text deserve being mentioned for how 
closely they anticipate images used in contemporary feminist theory: Simmel’s proposition 
that social divisions can be ‘traversed’ by way of consciousness (‘Durchquerung’; Simmel as 
above, 494; 173; 394) anticipates aspects of the feminist concept of ‘transversal politics’, a 
critique of ‘identity politics’ and the politics of ‘empowerment’ of ‘communities’ first proposed 
by Italian feminists in the 1970s. They used the concept to emphasize that women from different 
national backgrounds participated in their grassroots activities not ‘simplistically as 
representatives of their groupings’ (Yuval-Davis 1994, p. 192, 194).19 This notion is part of a 
tradition of feminist rejections of communitarianism that accept that ‘identity’ and ‘the self’ are 
‘situated’ by belonging to a ‘community’ but not determined by it: the possibility of ‘traversing’ 
circles at their intersections holds out the promise of emancipation, which clearly resonates with 
Simmel’s conception. Likewise, Simmel’s image of the ‘system of coordinates’ (Simmel as 
above, 466; 140; 371) that is constituted by the intersecting of social circles and defines the 
individual reverberates in Patricia Hill-Collins’ concept of the ‘matrix of domination’ 
(Collins 1991, p. 225). In the latter, the emphasis is on domination, of course, rather than 
constitution of the individual. 
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 Similar imagery can be found in Foucault who also drew on the discourses of ‘new’ social 
movements: ‘Just as the network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes 
through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the swarm 
of points of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities’ (Foucault 1990, 
p.96). 
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INTERSECTIONAL SOCIETY’S PROGRESS 
 
Simmel’s conception of the ‘intersection of social circles’ is on the one hand, highly generic 
– he suggests the concept can be applied to any form of human sociality as in his discussion 
of Australian Aborigines – on the other hand specifically relevant to modern society as he 
posits, in a manner reminiscent of progressivist, nineteenth-century liberal thinking (as in 
Spencer), a general tendency towards ‘social differentiation’ which to describe and illustrate 
is the function of Simmel’s concept of intersections: all human society is intersectional, but 
modern society is so to a much greater extent. For Simmel, intersectionality brings 
complexity, complexity brings more determinate individuality, and both together are the 
signature of civilizational progress.
20
 The circles – in the double meaning of the term: more 
abstract categories and more concrete groups – themselves are more ‘organic’, or primitive in 
pre-modern contexts, such as those ancient category-groups of age and sex, and more 
dependent on intellectually articulated purposes in modernity, with the ‘republic of scholars’ 
as the circle where one can be most individual, i.e. most human (still a good idea, although 
increasingly precarious). Most remarkable is perhaps Simmel’s distinction – not quite 
explicit, but clear enough – between ‘women’ as a simply ascriptive category, or group, 
before the modern period and ‘women’ as an actual group that forms solidarity on the basis of 
an intellectually articulated purpose – emancipation – in the present.  
Simmel’s account of the intersection of social circles, like his conception of 
modernity in general, does acknowledge that an increasingly complex society forces the 
increasingly individualized individual to face problems, namely ambivalence and lack of 
security (anticipating aspects of the ‘risk society’ of contemporary sociology [Beck 1992]). 
Simmel’s liberal optimism prevails, though: the necessity to reconcile an increasing ‘diversity 
of group-interests’ (468; 141; 373) strengthens the ‘unity’ or ‘integrity of the personality’ 
which is something many contemporary readers will acknowledge: the strength needed to 
form a strong personality let alone to oppose societal domination and exploitation comes, if it 
comes at all, from overcoming adversity and working through the contradictions of one’s 
positioning. Beyond this, Simmel touches (briefly) on the question of power differentials, 
such as in the already mentioned cases of a ‘high placed man’ drafted into the army and that 
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 Levine (1991) emphasized the centrality of the value of individuality throughout Simmel’s 
work. 
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of ‘the tutor of a prince’. Points Simmel makes on the intersections of nation and religion are 
echoed by contemporary studies (e.g. Marx 2003; Gorski 2003). Simmel does not take up the 
issue of ‘race’, a subject German sociologists at the time tended to bracket out if at all 
possible (Bodemann 2014) – although he briefly mentions Jewishness, which was then in the 
German context the prime example of ‘race’. The fact that he contrasts Jewishness with 
Catholicism, however, indicates that Jewishness comes for him under ‘religion’, not ‘race’. 
Simmel directly addresses sex and class, though. 
 Whereas he had referred to sex as a pre-modern, ‘organic’ category or group earlier in 
the same chapter, Simmel discusses ‘women’ and ‘workers’ in parallel as two typically 
modern ‘circles’ whose constitution involves processes of abstraction and intellectual 
reflection. As for workers, the argument goes that the diversity of trades that results from the 
increasing division of labour is ‘traversed’ by a growing awareness of all workers’ shared 
opposition to capital, which becomes real only through consciousness of it. Likewise, women 
are forming in the modern period ‘a higher circle that is defined by a general concept’ (501; 
182; 399) because increasing differentiation and an incipient tendency towards equality 
enables women to gain consciousness of their (already diminishing) difference from men. It 
is implied that ‘woman’ is a ‘higher circle’ now because it is based on social awareness and 
the formation of a concept, i.e. intellectual effort. These modern circles, ‘worker’ and 
‘woman’, do not emerge spontaneously but through purposeful and reflective intervention, 
and are thus indicative of the increasing humanity of humanity.
21
 In Simmel’s description, the 
modern, multiply intersecting and therefore self-conscious and active category ‘woman’, 
organized around a consciously formulated societal purpose, emancipation, is a modern 
development and results from the relative weakening, if not disappearance of what women 
may have been like before the modern period: fundamentally different from men but totally 
isolated as members of the family, unable actually to form a ‘social circle’ in the more 
concrete sense of the word. Simmel conceives of the emergence of the modern category 
‘woman’ – both the concept and its actuality – as the result of the disintegration of the old 
order. This historical tendency in turn contributes to and intensifies the process of 
modernization.  
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 This conception resembles Georg Lukács’s conception of proletarian ‘standpoint’ and the 
role of consciousness for the emancipation struggle (Lukács 2010) that was central for some 
strands of 1970s and 1980s socialist-feminist theory (e.g. Hartsock 1979). Lukács was a 
student of Simmel. 
24 
 
For Simmel, increasing intersectionality means increasing individuality which in turn 
means increasing modernity. In this respect, Simmel’s discussion of ‘the intersection of social 
circles’ is a form of historical sociology: his often so-designated ‘formal sociology’ is in fact 
a historical sociology of social forms. Although Simmel is all in all a much less confidently 
‘Whiggish’ believer in evolutionary progress than for example Spencer may have been, the 
sixth chapter of Sociology is clearly underpinned by a sense that a historical tendency towards 
increasing complexity is inherent in the history of modern society. This sense in turn is the 
basis of the belief that women and other laggards in the evolution of humanity will inevitably 
be emancipated into a state of majority and equality by stepping into more and more 
intersections of social circles, i.e. taking part more fully in modern, liberal, capitalist 
civilization. In other texts by Simmel, this liberal perspective is counteracted by the quasi-
romantic, utopian belief that the potentially transcendental powers of femininity should be 
protected from the banal workings of ‘objective culture’, which means ‘woman’ should better 
not intersect with too many other ‘circles’ lest ‘femininity’ spend itself like small change 
does. Although either perspective would seem either naïve or objectionable nowadays when 
explicitly stated, implicitly both seem still operative in the discourses of emancipatory 
movements: the question whether emancipation of the individual comes from increased 
participation in the institutions and practices of modern, liberal society (wage labour, the 
state, the ‘culture industry’ etc.), or whether it depends on the protection of remaining 
vestiges of genuine individuality (or femininity, family values, indigenousness, spirituality, 
etc.) from colonization by ‘the system’ remains as acute as it was in Simmel’s time.  
The case is different with the nineteenth-century belief in the inevitability of progress 
that would seem quaint at least to those socialised in the period after circa 1968 when both 
‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ versions of the ‘lower case liberal’ paradigm of modernization 
theory were irreparably damaged (Wallerstein 1995). The opposite perspective, namely that 
progress and individuality are gradually diminishing in the process of modernization first 
asserted itself forcefully during World War I which progressive intellectuals like Simmel or 
Durkheim initially still had welcomed in the name of the defence of the ‘civilization’ they 
credited with carrying forth individualism and emancipation. This kind of defence turned out 
self-defeating, but it took World War 2, the Holocaust and another two eventful decades until 
scepticism corroded the belief in progress.  
Simmel’s account of the intersection of social circles and contemporary 
intersectionality theory fundamentally differ in that intersectionality in Simmel is seen as 
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enabling, whereas feminist intersectionality theory aims to describe and explain how 
structural aspects of modern society limit emancipation and produce inequality and 
exploitation. This difference is related to the changed overall perspective on modernity. 
Simmel’s point that increasing intersectionality is one of the ‘benchmarks of civilization’ 
(Simmel as above, 464; 138; 370), however, remains as an important contribution: a formal 
characteristic of modern society that was visible to observers like Lazarus, Simmel and 
Cooley has meanwhile become ever the more a signature of modern society which is 
reflected in its status as a ‘buzzword’. The contemporary importance of the concept in its 
feminist theory version confirms, in turn, the significance of the concept coined by Lazarus 
and Simmel. 
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